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My dissertation focuses on empirically investigating two aspects of newspaper
endorsements: their influence on elections, and the factors determining these
recommendations.
In the first chapter of my dissertation, “Newspaper Political Endorsements
and Market Competition,” I develop and estimate a simple structural model
to identify the factors determining endorsements. I consider an environment
where newspapers are characterized by a political orientation and only make
well-informed endorsements. I use this framework to investigate the relation-
ship between newspaper endorsements and market competition. The model
also predicts how market competition might affect newspapers’ partisan be-
havior, and whether and to what extent competition makes partisan papers en-
dorsement behavior resemble that of non-partisan papers.
In the second chapter of my dissertation, “The Tuesday Advantage of Candi-
dates Endorsed by American Newspapers,” I document the electoral advantage
of candidates who have a newspaper endorsement published on Election Day
in comparison to other endorsed candidates. I provide evidence that this advan-
tage is not driven by a selection effect, suggesting that it is instead explained by
readers deciding how to vote based on endorsements read on Election Day. This
chapter’s results imply both a causal effect of newspaper political endorsements
on voting outcomes, and that the endorsement publication date determines the
effectiveness of this advice.
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CHAPTER 1
NEWSPAPER POLITICAL ENDORSEMENTS AND MARKET
COMPETITION
1.1 Introduction
The newspaper industry has an important societal role: it collects information
and reports to readers. However, the accuracy and fairness of its news are not
always verifiable. Papers facing competition are expected to be higher quality,
more diverse, fairer, and more responsive than monopolistic newspapers (Fed-
eral Communications Commission 2003, Bagdikian 1992, Entman 1985).
Motivated by this idea and by the decline of newspapers’ circulation,1 the
Newspaper Preservation Act was signed in 1970. It authorized the formation
of Joint Operating Agreements (JOA) among competing newspapers operating
within the same market area.2 JOA allowed newspapers to combine business
operations (advertising and circulation), but they were required to maintain
separate – and competitive – news operations and editorial sections. The goal
was to preserve competition, aiding the survival of multiple daily newspapers
in a given market (Busterna and Piccard 1993). Despite this public effort, there
is little empirical evidence of whether or how newspapers’ speech responds
to competition.3 This study takes a step toward answering this, investigating
the association between market competition and newspaper political endorse-
1Between 1923 and 1980, the number of counties with more than two competing newspapers
fell by half - from 45% of counties with at least one newspaper to about 21% (Genesove 1999).
2Many such agreements were formed: The Detroit News joined with The Detroit Free Press,
The Cincinnati Enquirer joined with The Cincinnati Post, Denver Post joined with Rocky Mountain
News, and others.
3Other papers that also investigate this relationship are Lacy and Davenport (1994), Entman
(1985).
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ments.
It focuses on these recommendations because they circumvent measurement
challenges. First, endorsements are an objective measure of newspaper political
opinion, since they represent a clear stand favoring a candidate.4 Second, dur-
ing elections newspapers face an identical opportunity of taking a stand. There-
fore, their choice set is observable (as opposed to news that are determined by
a random occurrence of events and are unobservable to readers until reported).
Measuring the correlation between competition and newspaper speech is also
challenging. Newspapers face a different set of competitors in different geo-
graphical areas, while news are supposed to reach all newspaper readers. Po-
litical endorsements are tailored messages for a subset of readers: those who
live in a particular district. This feature allows one to test whether the level of
competition a newspaper faces in a electoral district correlates with its behavior.
It also allows one to control for readership characteristics, such as demograph-
ics and political leanings, that might determine both endorsements and market
structure.
By design, there is a ”separation wall” between the editorial and news sec-
tion. However, many studies show that editorial page opinions infiltrate news
pages (Puglisi and Snyder 2008, Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder 2007, Druckman
and Parkin 2005, Kahn and Kenney 2002). For these reasons, political endorse-
ments qualify as a good object of study to uncover the relationship between
competition and newspaper’ speech. In addition, the literature provides evi-
dence that newspaper endorsements affect voter perception of candidates and
4Other measures of political opinion used in the political science and communication liter-
ature to identify media speech and political favoritism are space (soundbites) and tone given
to a candidate. See D’Allesio and Allen (2000), Lowry and Schidler (1995), Danton, Beck and
Huckfeldt (1998), Kahn and Kenney (2002) and Druckman and Parkin (2005).
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influence elections (Ladd and Lenz 2009, Leon 2009, Knight and Chiang 2008).
This chapter addresses the following question: how does market compe-
tition correlate with newspapers’ likelihood of making endorsements or their
choice of which candidate to endorse? To answer this, I collect a new dataset on
demographics and market structure characteristics at the county level. I propose
a simple data transformation to identify these characteristics at the newspaper-
district level. The variation in the data (across newspapers within a district and
within a newspaper across districts) allows me to hold constant politicians’ be-
havior, readership and newspapers’ intrinsic characteristics that are correlated
both with endorsement behavior and market structure. I then ask: (i) whether
a newspaper changes its endorsement practice when it faces a different mar-
ket structure; (ii) whether newspapers that self-select into competitive market
structures have a different endorsement behavior than those newspapers that
do not.
To identify the relationship between endorsement practice and market com-
petition, I first show the results of a probit model that explains: (i) probability
of an endorsement, and, (ii) probability of an endorsement to a candidate. The
key explanatory variable is the particular market structure a newspaper faces
in a district - monopolistic, duopolistic or competitive. Next, I present a simple
structural model of newspaper endorsements. I consider an environment where
newspapers are characterized by a political orientation – left-, neutral or right-
wing– and only make well-informed endorsements. The goal of this model is to
quantify media-bias and perform counterfactuals to predict how market com-
petition might affect newspapers’ partisan behavior.
This work relates closely to the literature that studies the determinants of
3
newspaper endorsements. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study
that investigate newspapers’ choice of whether to make an endorsement and
whether readership and market structure characteristics correlate with this de-
cision. Previous studies only focused on understanding the determinants of
newspaper choice between Republicans and Democrats (Puglisi and Snyder
2008, Knight and Chiang 2008, Kim 2008, Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder 2007,
Ansolabehere, Lessem, and Snyder 2006).
Part of the literature has explored newspaper endorsements to show that
newspapers display partisan behavior in their news reporting (Puglisi and Sny-
der 2008, Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder 2007, Druckman and Parkin 2005, Kahn
and Kenney 2002). This study contributes to the literature on newspapers’ polit-
ical behavior, by testing whether newspapers’ political orientation affects their
endorsements. The proposed framework allows me to quantify whether and
to what extent competition affects media bias. The closest study to this is Kim
(2008). She investigates newspaper endorsements in presidential elections and
finds evidence that competitive newspapers are more attentive to readers’ can-
didate preferences than monopolistic newspapers.
This chapter’s findings suggest that market competition affects newspapers’
endorsement practice. It operates mainly by restraining newspapers from mak-
ing endorsements. This result is observed on both raw correlations and probit
regressions controlling for newspaper- and electoral race-fixed effects.
Turning to the remaining results, the estimates for the structural coefficients
are consistent with the view of newspapers as politically biased: they take their
political preferences into consideration when choosing their endorsements and
are more likely to be partisan than non-partisan. The counterfactual exercise
4
shows that competition makes the endorsement practices of partisan newspa-
pers converge to those of non-partisan papers, but only slightly.
This chapter proceeds in six sections. Section 1.2 describes endorsement
practices and discusses why and how endorsements might be correlated with
market competition. Section 1.3 explains the data and the constructed measures
of readership and market structure at the newspaper-district level. Section 1.4
presents the results of a probit model. Section 1.5 describes a simple structural
model of endorsement, and presents its results. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Political Endorsements
1.2.1 Some Background
Political endorsement are located in the editorial or opinion-editorial (Op-Ed)
section of the newspaper. The editorial section is the institutional opinion of
the newspaper, representing its voice for endorsing candidates, taking a stance
on issues, criticizing official decisions and commenting on events. The editorial
board decides the newspaper endorsements. It consists of the editorial page
editor, the editorial cartoonist and other writers, and is officially subordinate to
the publisher.
The endorsement process starts with newspapers first deciding which races
to investigate. Then, they contact politicians and invite them to come for an in-
terview (Meltzer 2007, Post Crescent 2006, Lincoln Journal Star 2002). Endorse-
ments are decided after the editorial board collects and takes into considera-
5
tion various pieces of candidate information: campaign material, news stories,
personal interviews, educational background, experience in politics, and civic
involvement. Newspapers describe political recommendations as driven by a
feeling of obligation to educate and provide guidance to their readers.5
1.2.2 Endorsements and Market Competition
There are several reasons why a relationship between market competition and
endorsements is expected. Overall, market competition might influence news-
papers’ characteristics and politicians’ behavior. These, intern, might affect
newspapers’ endorsement practices. I will describe three main mechanisms.
First, market structure might affect newspapers’ political orientation
(Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010, Chiang 2008, Mullainathan and Shleifer 2004) or
their degree of partisanship. Newspapers’ political orientations probably de-
termine their evaluation of candidates and their likelihood of making endorse-
ments.
Second, despite (or in addition to) their political views, profit-motivated
newspapers might react to competition. This is expected as endorsements are
decided in part by the publisher, who is the business executive of the paper.6
5”Most voters go to polls having never met the candidates and knowing little about many
of them. Having spent hours looking into candidates or issues, most editorial page editors
know many readers appreciate having their insights. It seems logical that a trusted newspaper,
especially one with which the voter frequently agrees philosophically, can be called upon for
election insights, in much the same way a decision about whether to see a movie may depend
on whether the newspaper’s film critic recommends it” (Florida Times-Union 2006)
6This position is occupied by a career executive with vast knowledge of the newspaper mar-
ket. For example, the New York Times publisher—Arthur Sulzberger, Jr—joined The Times in
1978 as a correspondent and since then has worked in a variety of business departments, such
as production and corporate planning. He also worked as assistant publisher and deputy pub-
6
He/she might make strategic choices depending on the level of competition
faced in a market (Black 1982).
How market forces affect newspapers’ willingness to make endorsements is
ambiguous. On one hand, endorsements represent (possibly useful) informa-
tion readers look for during elections. It is presumably costly to gather political
information and newspapers have a limited amount of resources to allocate to
this end. They might allocate those in areas where they face more competition,
as a way to further differentiate themselves, as opposed to areas where they are
monopolists.
On the other hand, newspapers are bound to disagree with some of their
readers, when making endorsements. This is one reason that prevents newspa-
pers from making endorsements (San Francisco Chronicle, 2002). Under com-
petition, this fear might be exacerbated, inhibiting newspapers from taking po-
litical sides.
Newspapers’ choice of whom to endorse might also be affected by competi-
tion. Under competition, newspapers might become more likely to make safer
endorsements. They may feel inclined to sway their endorsements to the incum-
bent as a way to gain credibility with readers, by having their name associated
with the (likely) winner, instead of with the (likely) defeated candidate.7
Third, politicians’ behavior might be correlated with market competition.
Stromberg and Snyder (2008) provide evidence that incumbents attend to their
lisher, overseeing the news and business departments, before becoming publisher of The New
York Times in 1992.
7The idea of newspapers competing for readers via their political endorsements departs from
other arguments explored in the literature. For example, Mullainathan and Shleifer (2004) de-
veloped a model where, in equilibrium, readers read newspapers that more closely reflect their
own political inclinations. Therefore, ”in this world,” there is no reason for newspapers to be
affected by the threat of competition.
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constituencies’ needs better in areas with higher newspaper coverage.8 Market
structure might be correlated with media exposure. For example, citizens that
live in competitive markets might have characteristics –like being more edu-
cated or politically informed– that makes them more prone to read newspapers.
In this case, incumbent “quality” might respond to market structure, making
newspapers more likely to make endorsements.
This chapter mainly seeks to identify the correlation between market com-
petition and endorsement practice. It will make a small attempt at understand-
ing some mechanisms by which competition correlates with newspapers’ en-
dorsements. By examining whether a given newspaper varies its endorsements
according to the competition level faced in different districts, I will try to dis-
tinguish between two possibilities. The first one is that competition correlates
with endorsement behavior because it determines newspapers’ intrinsic charac-
teristics (such as their political position). The second is that market competition
makes newspapers endorse strategically due to competition with other news-
papers.
1.3 Data
This study explains the political endorsement choices of ninety American daily
newspapers in electoral races for the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives, State Governor, Secretary of State, state Attorney General and the state
Senate in 2002 and 2006. In total, 154 electoral races are considered. For each
8They find that politicians who are less covered by the local press are less likely to stand
witness before congressional hearings and to serve on constituency-oriented committees. Also,
federal spending is lower in areas where there is less press coverage of the local members of
Congress.
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newspaper, endorsement choices are observed in up to twenty-five political
races. The chosen newspapers are in seven states—California, Florida, Michi-
gan, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin—comprised of 658 counties. Endorse-
ments were collected from Lexis, Newsbank databases and newspapers’ web-
sites. Newspapers and electoral races considered are listed in Appendix.9
The remaining data are candidate and newspaper characteristics, cross sec-
tions of readership demographics and political leanings, and measures of news-
paper reader share and market competition in an electoral district. Candidate
characteristics were collected from the Election Divisions of the Secretaries of
State. The construction and sources of market structure measures and reader-
ship characteristics are explained in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2, after the aggregate
endorsement patterns are presented.
Different endorsement patterns are observed across districts with different
market structures. Newspapers are significantly more likely to make endorse-
ments in monopolistic than in duopolistic or competitive districts. In addition,
newspapers are more likely to endorse incumbent candidates in competitive
districts than in duopolistic districts.
In the remainder of Section 1.3, I explain how I constructed a measure of mar-
ket competition and readership characteristics at the newspaper-district level.
Some readers not interested in this might prefer to move to Section 1.4, where
regression results are reported.
9The sample of newspapers was selected from papers that report to the Audit Bureau of
Circulations (ABC). Of this group, only newspapers that made at least one political endorsement
during any election were selected (the ones identified as having an endorsement practice).
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1.3.1 Market Definition
In order to investigate the relationship between endorsements and competition,
I identified the level of competition faced by a newspaper in a electoral district.10
In order to construct this measure, I first classified counties as monopolistic,
duopolistic or competitive, following the methodology utilized in Borenstein
and Rose (1994). A county was classified as having a monopolistic structure
if a single newspaper has more than 90% of total circulation in the market. A
county was classified as having a duopolistic structure if any two newspapers
account for more than 90% of total circulation. A county was classified as hav-
ing a competitive structure if it was not classified as having a monopolistic or
a duopolistic structure. To construct these classes, I used information about
newspaper county circulation, available from The Audit Bureau of Circulation
(ABC).11
Table 1.1 shows that on average, there are three newspapers operating per
county. The main newspaper market share is, on average, 76.6%. Most counties
have a duopolistic (39.1%), followed by a monopolistic (34.8%) and a competi-
tive (26.1%) structure. As the degree of competition in a county increases, the
larger the number of newspapers and the lower the main newspaper’s market
share.
10Alternative measures of competition in the newspaper market are used in the literature. For
example, Chiang (2007) classified newspapers as monopolist or duopolist according to The Ed-
itor and Publisher International Year Book classification, which lists multiple-newspaper cities.
11For all 658 counties considered, I identified all the operating newspapers and their partici-
pation at that level based on 2005 circulation data. For the seven states in this study, the news-
paper market is composed of two hundred and thirty-one newspapers. Larger newspapers are
over-represented in this sample, and it represents 20.4% of total newspapers in the seven states.
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Table 1.1: County market structure - newspaper market
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max counties
Main newspaper’s market share 76.6 83 22.3 22.1 100 658
Number of newspapers 3.0 3 1.7 1 9 658
Monopolistic (34.8%)
Main newspaper’s market share 97.7 99.9 3.1 90 100 229
Number of newspapers 2 2 1.4 1 9 229
Duopolistic (39.1%)
Main newspaper’s market share 75.1 78.7 12.3 47.8 89.9 257
Number of newspapers 3.1 3 1.2 2 8 257
Competitive (26.1%)
Main newspaper’s market share 55.6 54.6 20.5 22.1 89.9 172
Number of newspapers 4.5 4 1.9 3 9 172
1.3.2 Readership Characteristics
This study identifies the correlation between competition and endorsement
behavior through cross-sectional comparisons. In order to help to isolate the
effect of competition on newspaper behavior, I consider demographics, political
leanings and a measure that conveys a readership’s degree of homogeneity.
Demographic characteristics—education, race, gender— and total popula-
tion, income and level of urbanization were collected from the Census Bureau.
To identify counties political leanings, I used the two-party vote share to John
Kerry in the 2004 presidential elections, collected from the Election Divisions
of the Secretaries of State. In addition, I created two variables to capture the
overall and political heterogeneity of readers.12
The first is an index of political homogeneity. This is the absolute distance
between the 2004 presidential vote-share to John Kerry, and 0.5, which repre-
sents a bipartisan county. It is a measure of how the politically homogeneity of
12The composition of newspaper readership is not observable at the county level. In this
study, I assume that county population is representative of the readership at this level.
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district’s readership.13
The second is a measure of county overall homogeneity conveying demo-
graphic and political characteristics. It is constructed based on three variables:
maximum fraction of whites, blacks and Hispanics (a), fraction of males (b) and
the constructed index of political homogeneity (g). The measure of readership
overall homogeneity, Homog, is defined as:
Homog = (a2) + (b2) + (g2).14
Endorsement choices are observed at the district level. Since newspaper
readership characteristics and market competition are only available at the
county level, I aggregated county characteristics at the district level.
1.3.3 Aggregation at the Newspaper-District Level
The races considered in this study are the ones for which the county is a
subset of an electoral district.15 When explaining endorsement choices in guber-
natorial races, I aggregated county level characteristics at the state level. When
explaining endorsement choices in the U.S. House of Representatives, I aggre-
gated characteristics at the specific congressional district level.
13For example, if John Kerry received one hundred percent of the votes (or zero percent of
the votes) in a county, this measure would be equal to 0.5. If he received half of the votes, this
measure would be equal to zero. Within this index metric, heterogeneous counties must be
closer to zero and more homogeneous counties must be closer to 0.5.
14To illustrate this variable, suppose the county is homogeneous: the whole population is
composed of white males that voted for George Bush in the 2004 presidential election. In this
case, the value of this variable is 3. Opposed to this, assuming the county is heterogeneous –
one third of the county is black, white or hispanic, half of the county is male and half of it voted
for Gerge Bush in the 2004 presidential election – the value of this variable will be 0.59.
15A map with an example is available in Appendix.
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The aggregation of county characteristics at the district level is a simple
(weighted) average of county characteristics across counties in a district. The
weights are newspaper specific. They are the ratio between a newspaper’s
reader share at the county level16 and its total reader share at the district level.17
They were constructed in the following way: a newspaper jcirculates in a dis-
trict d, composed of mcounties indexed by u. Using the information about
newspaper county circulation, I calculated the newspaper county reader share
(RC ju),district reader share (RD jd)and Weights jdas described below:
RD jd =
m∑
u=1
RC ju
Weight ju =
RC ju
RD jd
Next, I constructed newspaper-district characteristics (X jd)as described be-
low, using county characteristics (Xu)and Weights.
X jd =
m∑
u=1
(Weight ju)Xu
Table 1.2 illustrates the aggregation with an example. Congressional Dis-
trict 2 in Michigan is composed of three counties: Berrien, Ionia and Kent. They
have different population sizes (162,453; 61,518 and 574,335, respectively). Table
1.2 describes three papers that operate in this congressional district: The Grand
Rapid Press, The Detroit News and The Daily News. These papers have differ-
ent reader shares in Berrien, Ionia and Kent.18 In constructing the weights and
16Newspaper county reader share is the percentage of newspapers’ readers that live in a
county.
17Newspaper district reader share is the percentage of newspapers’ readers that live in a dis-
trict.
18For example, 61.5% of The Grand Rapid Press readership is in Kent. 13.25% of The Daily News
readership is in Ionia.
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Table 1.2: Aggregation within congressional district 2 - Michigan
RC
Grand Rapid Press Detroit News Daily News X
Berrien 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 162,453
Ionia 0.0239 0.0010 0.1325 61,518
Kent 0.6150 0.0052 0.0079 574,335
RD 0.6389 0.0073 0.1404
Weights
Grand Rapid Press Detroit News Daily News X jd
Berrien 0.0000 0.1507 0.0000 555,152
Ionia 0.0374 0.1370 0.9437 442,022
Kent 0.9626 0.7123 0.0563 90,373
aggregating county characteristic, Xu(population in this case), one can identify
variation in readership size across newspapers for Congressional District 2. In
this example, they are: 555,152, 442,022 and 90,373, for The Grand Rapid Press, The
Detroit News and The Daily News, respectively. This aggregation was performed
for all characteristics (readership and market structure), for all newspapers, in
every district, for every district where a newspaper circulates. In this fashion, I
created newspaper-district-markets (three in this example).
Note that this simple aggregation rule generates (helpful) variation that
come from two facts: (i) for the considered races, a district is composed of
several heterogeneous counties; (ii) different newspapers have different reader
share in the counties that make up a district. This allows me to identify variation
in characteristics across newspapers within a district. Since several endorse-
ments by a single newspaper are observed and different districts are composed
of different counties, this aggregation also allows me to observe variation in
characteristics within newspapers across districts.
The construction of characteristics at the newspaper-district level was per-
formed only for cases where a newspaper circulates in a district (since county
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Table 1.3: Characteristics by market type - mean values
Monopolistic Duopolistic Competitive
Age 36.24 36.46 36.56
Male 49.14 49.23 49.56
White (%) 75.54 73.65 74,60
Black (%) 10.08 7.76 5.67
Hispanic (%) 9.58 12.88 13.59
Two party vote share to Kerry (%) 48.16 46.90 50.32
Political Homogeneity Index 9.22 8.48 8.28
Overall Homogeneity Index 0.85 0.83 0.87
Population 447,400 509,801 1,034,241
Urban (%) 72.24 74.08 69.48
At least some college (%) 82.52 80.94 80.66
Newspaper reader share (%) 73.11 70.43 52.52
Number of
newspaper-district-markets 258 308 259
circulation is needed to construct the weights). All total, 825 newspaper-district-
markets were generated.
Table 1.3 shows summary statistics of demographics and political inclina-
tions of newspaper readership at the newspaper-district level, for different mar-
ket structure. Monopolistic districts are more likely to be located in non-urban
areas; readers there are more likely to be politically and racially homogenous
and less likely to be black. In duopolistic districts, readers are more likely to
be heterogeneous. Competitive districts are characterized by areas with larger
population. Readers in these districts are more likely to be Democratically-
oriented and males. Newspapers have a smaller share of readers in competitive
districts than in duopolistic or competitive districts.
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1.4 Probit Results
This section reports the results of probit regressions explaining newspapers
endorsement behavior. I first explain newspapers’ probability of making an
endorsement. The empirical specification is expressed by (1).
y jrt = α + γCOMP jr + αDUOP jr + β jz j + βrvr + θ j + θr + θt + ε jrt (1)
The dependent variable is a dummy of value one if a newspaper j made an
endorsement in race r in year t, and zero otherwise. The coefficients of interest
are γ and α, representing the correlation between circulating in a specific market
structure (competitive or duopolistic, respectively) and newspaper’s likelihood
of making an endorsement. The excluded (and baseline) category is the monop-
olistic structure. Other characteristics, possibly correlated with the newspapers’
probability of making an endorsement, are controlled for. These are z j, repre-
senting newspaper readership (demographics and of political views) and other
newspaper characteristics. Electoral race characteristics are represented by vr.
Newspaper-, electoral race- and year-fixed effects are represented by θ j, θr, θt,
and ε jrt represents a stochastic error term. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the level of the 154 races.
The results are described in Table 1.4. The estimated coefficients, presented
in Column 1, reflect the correlations observed in Figure 1. Newspapers are more
likely to make endorsements in monopolistic than in duopolistic or competitive
districts. This correlation is robust to the inclusion of readership and newspaper
characteristics (Column 2).
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Table 1.4: Probability of an endorsement - marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Competitive -0.116** -0.115** -0.064** -0.047* -0.084**
(0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.027) (0.045)
Duopolistic -0.057** -0.086** -0.080** 0.018 -0.0347
(0.025) (0.027) (0.036) (0.026) (0.043)
Readership, newspaper and n y y y n
Electoral race characteristics
Year- and Electoral race-fixed n n y n y
effects (r=154)
Year- and Newspaper-fixed n n n y y
effects ( j=90)
R2 0.4179 0.4955 0.5240 0.5175 0.6307
Number of observations 1692 1692 1692 1692 1692
Notes: 1) Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 2) Competitive
(Duopolistic) refers to a dummy indicating whether the newspaper
circulates in the district interacted with the proportion of the district
in which a newspaper operates in a competitive (duopolistic) structure.
3) Readership controls include gender, income, education, population,
urban, two party vote share to John Kerry, ideology index, race (black,
white and Hispanic), and a dummy indicating whether a newspaper
circulates in the district. Newspaper controls include a dummy indicating
whether the newspaper is among the top100 largest papers in the US.
Electoral race controls include a dummy indicating whether the race is
statewide, a dummy indicating whether it is a close race (whether the
winning candidate received at most 55% of total vote-share), a
dummy indicating whether the incumbent is not running for re-election in
the race and a dummy indicating whether the race took place in 2002.
4) **Significant at the 5% level.
Column 3 shows the results controlling for electoral race-fixed effects. This
specification is convenient for separating the effect of competition on endorse-
ments from politician’s behavior. Under this specification, the estimate of γ
changes. This reveals that newspapers are inherently less likely to endorse
politicians that run in races with higher level of market competition. One ex-
planation for this is that newspapers are driven to make endorsements in sup-
posedly ”interesting” races. As discussed before, incumbents in a competitive
structure might be ”better politicians” than other incumbents. They might at-
tract less qualified challengers. In these races, readers face less uncertainty
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about who is the more qualified candidate.
Column 4 shows the results controlling for newspaper-fixed effects. This
specification is useful to understand whether newspapers respond to competi-
tion across districts, allocating their resources accordingly. The estimate results
suggest that newspapers prioritize to provide political opinion in areas where
they face less competition.
The size of γ diminishes when newspaper-fixed effects are included. In ad-
dition, under this specification, the coefficient associated with duopolistic dis-
tricts is no longer significant. These results combined show that newspapers
that self-select in duopolistic or competitive markets are inherently less likely to
make endorsements.
Next, I estimate newspapers’ probability of endorsing Democrats. Endorse-
ment observations were restricted to cases where a newspaper made an en-
dorsement (either to a Democrat or to a Republican). The goal is to understand
whether market competition is associated with a convergence or divergence of
endorsements. I will test this, investigating a particular case. I will look whether
incumbents are more likely to be endorsed when newspapers face more compe-
tition, following the specification expressed by (2):
y jrt = α+β∗Incumbentrt+δCOMP∗jrIncumbentrt+θDUOP
∗
jrIncumbentrt+θ j+θr+ε jct (2)
The dependent variable is a dummy of value one in case a newspaper en-
dorsed a Democrat in a race r, in year t, and zero if it endorsed a Republican.
The variables of interest to understand whether market competition correlates
with newspapers’ choices of whom to endorse are δ and θ.
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Table 1.5 describes the results. The estimate of β shows that newspapers are
more likely to endorse incumbents than other candidates. This result is robust
to all specifications. The coefficients reported in Column 1 reflect raw correla-
tions. They show that newspapers facing competitive rather than duopolistic or
monopolistic environments, are more likely to endorse incumbents. Controling
for readership, race and newspaper characteristics, the coefficient δ is only sig-
nificant at the 12% level. Column 3 shows the results controlling for electoral
race-fixed effects. Since this specification estimate the likelihood of an endorse-
ment within a race, it controls for candidates’ characteristics (other than being
Democrat and Incumbent). Presumably, these are an important determinants of
endorsements. As expected, I cannot reject the joint test that the district fixed
effects are zero (F-test =2.37).
Under this specification, the estimate of δ is no longer significant, but its size
remains almost the same. It is important to keep in mind that due to the small
number of observations (440) and large number of controls (154 race dummies),
this regression does not have enough power to detect an effect of competition
on newspapers’ choice of whom to endorse. However, the stability of this co-
efficient is suggestive of an association. Newspapers might be more likely to
endorse incumbents under competition regardless of candidate’ characteristics.
Column 4 shows the results controlling for newspaper-fixed effects. This
specification controls for newspapers’ intrinsic (and varied) endorsement rules.
I cannot reject the joint test that the newspaper-fixed effects are zero (F=1.943).
The signs of the coefficients δ and θ change and they are no longer statistically
significant. The difference in coefficient size and sign under these different spec-
ifications (with the inclusion of electoral district-fixed effect versus newspaper
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fixed effect) is suggestive of the mechanism by which competition might affect
newspapers’ endorsements. Newspapers might be more likely to endorse in-
cumbents because of their intrinsic characteristics (like their political position)
determined by a more competitive market structure. However, a given news-
paper does not become more likely to endorse the incumbent (and make a safer
endorsement) due to the threat of competition in a district.
The results described in Table 1.4 and 1.5 suggest that market competition
affects newspapers mainly by preventing them from making endorsements. At
least two mechanisms explain this finding. Newspapers that self-select into
competitive markets are inherently less likely to make endorsements. Also,
newspapers react to market competition strategically, becoming less likely to
endorse candidates. One explanation for this result is that newspapers might
raise their standards for making endorsements when they face more competi-
tion. They might prefer to be associated with ”better politicians” in these mar-
kets.
An important aspect of newspaper behavior not addressed in the probit re-
gressions is their partisanship. Most reader perceive newspapers as politically-
biased (Pew 2005). Newspapers vary in the frequency with which they endorse
candidates of a single party (Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder 2007). This is pos-
sibly explained by difference in newspapers’ political views and therefore on
their evaluation of candidates. Common wisdom suggest that market compe-
tition can minimize media-bias and make partisan newspapers behave as non-
partisan ones. In order to quantify media bias and to predict the extent to which
market competition can affect newspapers’ partisan behavior, I propose and es-
timate a simple structural model. It addresses this issue and takes into consider-
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Table 1.5: Probability of an endorsement to a Democrat - marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incumbent 0.181** 0.196** 0.543** 0.289**
(0.071) (0.773) (0.216) (0.134)
Incumbent∗Competitive 0.156* 0.153 0.177 -0.011
(0.091) (0.102) (0.327) (0.150)
Incumbent∗Duopolistic 0.039 0.003 -0.012 -0.064
(0.095) (0.104) (0.327) (0.146)
Readership, newspaper and
Electoral race characteristics n y n n
Year- and Electoral Race fixed-effects (r=154) n n y n
Year- and Newspaper fixed-effects ( j=90) n n n y
R2 0.0496 0.1271 0.3104 0.2322
Number of observations 483 224 224 440
Notes: 1) Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
2) Incumbent*Competitive refers to the interaction of a dummy
indicating the incumbent with the proportion of the district a
newspaper operates in a competitive structure.
Incumbent*Duopolistic refers to the interaction of a dummy
indicating the incumbent with the proportion of the district a
newspaper operates in a duopolistic structure.
3) **Significant at the 5% level.
ation the interdependence among endorsement choices (of whether and whom
to endorse).
1.5 A Simple Model of Endorsements
To illustrate the model’s main features and assumptions, consider the en-
vironment faced by a hypothetical newspaper. It is characterized by a political
orientation – left-wing, neutral or right-wing. In a general election, the news-
paper faces several simultaneous two-candidate races for which it can make
political recommendations. The endorsement represents the newspaper’s ex-
pressive vote, as opposed to an instrumental model whereby the newspaper
seeks to influence the election outcome. The newspaper likes to endorse candi-
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dates it thinks highly of. The value of an endorsement is determined solely by
its evaluation of the endorsed candidate.
For any election, the newspaper has knowledge about some characteristics of
the candidates running: it is aware of candidates’ incumbency and party affilia-
tion. These characteristics may affect the newspaper’s evaluation of candidates,
but the newspaper is not yet fully informed about other characteristics such as
honesty, competence and political record. These are important determinants of
its assessment of candidates and consequently of its endorsements. To find out
about these, the newspaper has to invest in a research process with interviews
and investigation of candidates’ records.
The newspaper faces the following problems: it has to decide in which of
the races it will provide its endorsement to readers. Since the research process
is costly, the newspaper has to decide whether to investigate or not the candi-
dates running in a race. For any given election, it makes its research decision
by comparing the expected value of its (future) endorsement with its cost of
making an endorsement. Once the research is done, the newspaper, fully in-
formed, declares its endorsement. I assume the research process is a necessary
and sufficient condition for the endorsement: the newspaper only makes well-
informed endorsements, and it makes some endorsement announcement, in all
investigated elections.19
I next summarize and introduce the notation. A newspaper j has one of
three possible political ideological positions (H ∈ {h1,h2,h3}), which are left-wing
19These assumptions are based both on newspaper anecdotes about their practice and data
limitation. In one hand, newspapers report they always investigate candidates before making
endorsements (Post Crescent 2006). On the other hand, I assumed that newspapers declare
endorsements whenever they investigate a race. This is because the situation where newspapers
investigate a race and do not make an endorsement is not observable.
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(h1), neutral (h2), and right-wing (h3). In general elections, it faces several races
e. For any of these, it potentially makes two sequential decisions. First, it makes
a decision t ∈ {0, 1} to research (t= 1) or not research (t= 0) the two candidates
c, c ∈ {D,R}. In making this decision, it compares the cost of investigating an
election (and making an endorsement) with the expected value of its announce-
ment. Second, conditional on investigating a race, it can make three types of
announcements i ∈ {D,R,∅},”endorse the Democrat” (i = D), ”endorse the Re-
publican” (i = R), or explicitly declare ”no endorsement for either of the can-
didates” (i = ∅). This last announcement represents newspaper abstention in
a political race once it determines that neither of the candidates meets its stan-
dards to receive an endorsement.20 I will next detail the payoffs and decision
problem for both decisions, starting with the second. After these components
are described, choice probabilities and estimation procedure are specified.
1.5.1 Endorsement Announcement Decision
In the second decision, conditional on having incurred costs in the research
process, the newspaper can make two types of announcements. The first type
favors a candidate. The payoff derived from this type of announcement is the
newspaper’s satisfaction from endorsing its preferred candidate and it is de-
termined by newspaper evaluation of the candidate. It has three components:
(i) a deterministic component related to newspaper political preference; (ii) a
deterministic component unrelated to newspaper political preference; and (iii)
20This assumption is based on evidence from the data. When newspapers declare ”no en-
dorsement for either candidate,” they justify this choice as due to the low qualifications of the
candidates. For example, The Record-Eagle made the following announcement in a race, in the
2006 election:
“There’s no good choice in this race. Incumbent Republican Mike Cox has shown he’ll put
politics over policy. His challenger, Democrat Amos Williams, isn’t qualified.”
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the newspaper’s overall evaluation of the candidates’ unobservable characteris-
tics - such as quality, honesty, and historical record - revealed through research
(εDj ,ε
R
j ).These are assumed to be drawn from a type I extreme value distribution
with mean zero and scale parameter σ = 1. The overall payoff from endorse-
ment of a candidate, denoted by S cj, is:
S cj(H, c) = v(H, c) + Z
c(XC j) + εcj, c = {D,R}
Ceteris paribus, left-wing (h1) and right-wing (h3) newspapers have an en-
dorsement for the Democrat and the Republican candidate, respectively, as
their most preferred decision. Neutral newspapers are indifferent between
Democrats or Republicans. The payoff v(H, c)that a newspaper of each type
derives from its endorsement of a candidate c, is as follows:
v(h1, c) =

γD, if c = D
0, if c = R

v(h2) = 0
v(h3, c) =

0, if c = D
γR, if c = R

The value of v(H, c)when a newspaper makes its less preferred decision is
normalized to 0. The payoff when it makes its preferred decision is γc.
The component unrelated to newspaper political preference, Zc,is a linear
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function of other candidate characteristics. I represent this term with a dummy
of value one if the candidate is an incumbent, and zero otherwise. To uncover
correlations between endorsements and competition, I allow Zcto be explained
by the interaction of the incumbent dummy with measures of market structure.
These variables are compressed in CAN jand described in detail in Appendix.
Besides endorsing the Democrat or Republican, newspapers can explicitly
announce ”no endorsement for either of the candidates” (i = ∅).21 This deci-
sion’s payoff has two components: (i) a deterministic component that represents
the newspaper’s standard for making an endorsement. Its value is normalized
to zero; (ii) newspaper shock specific to this alternative ε∅j , assumed to be drawn
from a type I extreme value distribution with mean zero and scale parameter
σ = 1.22 The payoff of this alternative is:
S ∅j (H) = ε
∅
j , for any H
At this (second) stage, the newspaper becomes fully informed and is able
to evaluate the respective payoffs of the three alternatives. It decides on its
announcement i∗according to the rule below:
i∗ = argmax{S i(H) : i ∈ {D,R,∅}}
21It is assumed that every time the newspaper incurs costs in the investigation process, it
makes an announcement. I allow for this option - abstention - to ensure newspapers are maxi-
mizing total utility.
22This component is supposed to capture the unobservable heterogeneity among newspapers
in their standards for declaring an endorsement. If newspapers only care about providing help-
ful advice to their readers, they would just need to pick the ”least worst” among the candidates.
However, in some elections, newspapers might worry about some reputational damage from
endorsing a ”bad politician.”
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1.5.2 Decision to Research
In the first decision, the newspaper faces the choice of whether or not to
research the candidates to find out their (ex-ante) unobservable characteristics.
The payoff to the newspaper’s investment in researching a race has two com-
ponents: the expected benefit and the cost of endorsement. The payoff of the
research alternative, denoted by RES , is described below:
RES j = E(ZDj ,Z
R
j ) −COST j(RC j)
The first element, E(ZDj ,Z
R
j ) denotes the expected benefit of a (future) en-
dorsement. This is the foreseen value of an endorsement and is a function of the
characteristics of candidates running in a political race combined with newspa-
per political orientation, as described in Section 1.5.1.
E(ZDj ,Z
R
j ) = Eε max{S i∗(H) : i ∈ {D,R,∅}}
= ln((exp(ZD(CAN j)) + exp(ZR(CAN j)) + 1))23
The endorsement cost, COST conveys both research and reputation costs in
making endorsements. I assumed a simple functional form for this, as described
below:
COST j = β0 + β0 · (RCE j) + β0 · (RCD j) + β0 · (RCM j) + ζCOSTj
23Under the stochastic term assumptions, this expectation has a well-known close form de-
rived in Small and Rosen (1981).
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It is determined by a fixed endorsement cost common to all newspapers
(β0). I then let the cost vary by newspaper size, reader share in a district and
election characteristics (RCE j). These characteristics might affect the research
cost as they convey, respectively, different levels of paper resources and em-
ployees, previous political knowledge of the district and politicians’ visibility.
I allow the cost to vary by readership demographics and political leanings in
a district (RCD j) as these might explain specialization in a market or differ-
ent perceived costs in making endorsements. Lastly, the cost might vary by
the market structure faced in the district (RCM j). These parameters partially
identify the correlation between newspapers’ likelihood of making endorse-
ments and market competition. The cost variables are compressed in RC j, where
RC j = (RCE j,RCD j,RCM j). These are detailed in the Appendix. The cost of
endorsement is also determined by a research cost shock ζRESj , assumed to be
drawn from a type I extreme value distribution with mean zero and scale pa-
rameter σ = 1.24
The payoff to non-researching, denoted by NRES , has two components: a
deterministic component normalized to zero and a taste shock ζNRESj associated
with this alternative.25 This is assumed to be drawn from a type I extreme value
distribution with mean zero and scale parameter σ = 1.
NRES j = ζNRESj
24This component is unobservable to the researcher and reflects, for example, a shortage of
interns to collect information about the politicians, or politicians directly contacting newspapers
to facilitate an interview.
25This stochastic term is supposed to explain any remaining difference in the research deci-
sions of different newspapers when the research costs they face are the same. This could be
related to the editor’s mood, for example.
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A newspaper’s first decision is whether to investigate (t(H) = 1) or not in-
vestigate (t(H) = 0) in the race, solving the following problem:
Maxt(H)∈{0,1} t(H)[RES − NRES ]
1.5.3 Choice Probabilities and Estimation Procedure
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. For the construction of
the likelihood function, one needs to derive the choice probabilities. I will first
specify the probability of a decision to research and the conditional probabilities
of an endorsement after the newspaper has decided to invest in the research
process. Next, I specify the likelihood function, and the estimation procedure.
Choice Probability of Research. In the first decision, the probabilities of
research (t(H) = 1) and non-research (t(H) = 0) are derived based on integration
over ζ j and described:
Pr(t(H) = 1) =
exp(E(CAN j) −COST (RC j))
1 + exp(E(CAN j) −COST (RC j))
Pr(t(H) = 0) =
1
1 + exp(E(CAN j) −COST (RC j))
Choice Probability of an Announcement after Research: Conditional on in-
vesting in research, the newspaper learns εij, and decides which announcement
to make. Integrating the shocks, the probabilities of endorsing a Democrat, a Re-
publican, or declaring ”no endorsement for either candidate” are respectively:
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Pr(i(H) = R) =
exp(ZR(CAN j))
1 + exp(ZR(CAN j)) + exp(ZD(CAN j))
Pr(i(H) = D) =
exp(ZD(CAN j))
1 + exp(ZR(CAN j)) + exp(ZD(CAN j))
Pr(i(H) = ∅) =
1
1 + exp(ZR(CAN j)) + exp(ZD(CAN j))
The likelihood of an endorsement observation for a given race e and a given
newspaper political orientation type is denoted by L je:
L je(H) = [Pr(t(H) = 0)]I(t(H)=0) + [Pr(t(H) = 1) Pr(i(H))]I(t(H)=1)
Likelihood of the Entire Newspaper Endorsement Profile
Multiple endorsement choices are observed for each newspaper. By com-
bining the sequence of endorsement choices and summing over the possible
types of political orientation, the contribution of a newspaper j is Y j :
Y j =
∑
H∈{h1,h2,h3}
Pr(H)
∏
e
L je(H)

The log-likelihood function is then equal to the sum of the log of the indi-
vidual contributions Y j, over all newspapers in the sample: K =
∑
j ln Y j. The
parameters to be estimated are: i) editorial boards’ valuation of politicians’ char-
acteristics; ii) newspapers’ costs of making endorsements and iii) a probability
distribution for newspapers’ political orientation. The estimated parameters are
the ones that maximize the log-likelihood.
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Table 1.6: First decision payoffs: determinants of endorsement cost
Estimate Stand Error
β0 10.413** 0.851
β0· statewide race -0.135 0.309
β0· open race -1.088** 0.273
β0· close race 0.391 0.248
β0· 2002 election -0.473** 0.197
β0· Top 100 newspaper -0.978** 0.223
β0· Newspaper reader share -3.598** 0.365
β0· Urban -0.164 0.285
β0· Population 0.626** 0.321
β0· Income -0.784** 0.238
β0· College educated 0.114 0.248
β0· Political homogeneity index 3.206** 0.865
β0· Overall homogeneity index 2.431* 1.423
β0· John Kerry vote share 2.109** 0.754
β0·White 0.272 0.333
β0· Black 0.892** 0.235
β0· Hispanic 0.971** 0.270
β0·Male 0.097 0.212
β0· Competitive 0.315 0.332
β0· Duopolistic 0.262 0.366
Note: ** Statistically significant at 5% level, *10% level.
1.5.4 Results
The estimates for the first decision parameters are described in Table 1.6.
These are the determinants of newspapers’ endorsement costs. The parameters
are measured in a utility metric, so I will focus the interpretation on their sign.
These different costs are determined by newspapers’ likelihood of making en-
dorsements across districts: newspapers face lower (higher) costs in districts
where they are more (less) likely to make endorsements.
The results point to a positive cost of making endorsements as revealed by
the sign of β0 (10.413). Papers face different costs according to election, reader-
ship and newspaper characteristics. The cost is lower as the share of a news-
paper’s readers that live in the district increases. This is consistent with the
expectation that newspapers hold more political knowledge and face lower re-
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search costs in these elections. Characteristics such as number of employees
and overall newspaper resources also explain different costs. Newspapers faced
lower costs in the 2002 election than in the 2006 election. This is consistent with
the downsizing of the industry commonly associated with the expansion of on-
line news (Gentzkow 2007). In the 2002 election, newspapers may have had
more resources and staff to investigate elections and provide political advice.
Larger newspapers (those among the 100 largest newspapers in the US) face
lower costs, and therefore are more likely to make endorsements, than other
newspapers.
The cost depends on readership race, political leaning and degree of homo-
geneity. Newspapers face lower costs (and are more likely to make endorse-
ments) in districts more Democratically-oriented districts and in districts with
more homogeneous readerships, both politically and racially.
Newspapers face higher costs of making endorsements in a competitive and
duopolistic market structure than in a monopolistic environment. The sign of
these coefficients are consistent with the ones estimated in the probit model
presented in Table 1.4. However, under this empirical specification, they are not
statistically significant.
The estimates for the second decision payoff parameters are described in
Table 1.7. They show that both incumbency and political alignment between
candidate and newspaper are determinants of endorsements. The respective
estimated parameters are positive and statistically significant. The coefficient
associated with the political alignment between newspaper and candidate is
larger for left-wing than for right-wing newspapers. This suggests that left-
wing newspapers are more partisan than right-wing newspapers. However,
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Table 1.7: Second decision payoffs
Estimate Stand Error
Incumbent 2.066** 0.161
Incumbent in Competitive Districts 0.237 0.386
Incumbent in Duopolistic Districts 0.037 0.406
Political alignment with candidate
Right-wing newspaper: γR 1.447** 0.252
Left-wing newspaper: γD 1.744** 0.183
Note: ** Statistically significant at 5% level.
Table 1.8: Predicted probability of political orientation
Left-wing Neutral Right-wing
0.422 0.281 0.297
the large standard errors do not allow me to reject the hypothesis that these
coefficients are equal.
The coefficient associated with newspaper evaluation of the incumbent is
higher when the newspaper is operating in a competitive district than in a mo-
nopolistic district. However, these are also not statistically different from zero.
The model predicts newspapers are more likely to be partisan (have a left-
wing or a right-wing orientation) than non-partisan (have a neutral orientation),
as described in Table 1.8. These results (of being more likely to be partisan than
non-partisan, and tending to value their political alignment with candidates)
are consistent with the general view of newspapers as politically biased (Pew,
2005).
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1.5.5 Counterfactual - Media Bias and Competition
A nice feature of the econometric model is that one can conduct counterfac-
tuals with the estimated parameters of the model. I next present estimated prob-
abilities of endorsement, exogeneously changing both market structure faced by
all newspapers in the sample, and their degree of partisanship. The goal is to
understand whether and to what extent competition reduces media bias and
makes partisan newspapers behave like non-partisan ones.
For the counterfactual exercises, I assume that newspapers have only two
possible political orientations, neutral and left-wing. I varied their probability
of being non-partisan (having a neutral orientation) and partisan (having a left-
wing orientation). In the model, I assumed that partisan newspapers have an
extra incentive to make endorsements in comparison to non-partisan papers:
that of supporting candidates with similar political views.26 The implication is
that partisan newspapers are more likely to incur costs of making endorsements.
As the probability of newspapers being partisan increases, so does the predicted
probability of newspapers making endorsements. The predicted probability (of
making an endorsement) is reported, assuming all newspapers to be operating
in a specific market structure – competitive, monopolistic – or in the market
structure observed in the data (baseline). The more partisan a newspaper be-
26Data shows that this is a reasonable assumption. The model assumes newspapers make
two sequential choices. However, one can also imagine that newspapers make endorsements
without a research process, using only the information they have on hand. In this case, the
newspaper endorsement decision could be modeled by a multinomial logit. I compared this
model’s predictions with those of a multinomial logit with the same number of control vari-
ables. The model achieves a higher log-likelihood value (-813.80) than the multinomial logit
(-855.18), and predicts newspapers’ actual choices with higher success than a multinomial logit
does in 57.4% of the cases. This evidence suggests that the adopted model’ assumptions reflect
the data better than the ones behind the simple model. Table 10 presents the distribution of
the endorsement profiles – endorsement for the Democratic candidate, endorsement for the Re-
publican candidate, no endorsement for either candidate and no endorsement announcement –
predicted by the model and the distribution observed in the data.
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comes, the more its endorsement probability differs from a non-partisan paper.
Under competition, partisan papers become less likely of making endorsements,
resembling the behavior of non-partisan newspapers. Nonetheless, as Figure 3
shows, this effect is small.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter examined the determinants of newspaper political endorse-
ments. I presented results from probit regressions and from a simple structural
model. This model quantifies media bias and take into consideration the inter-
dependence of newspapers’ choice whether to make an endorsement and who
to endorse.
I investigated the empirical association between market competition and
newspaper political endorsements, exploring variation of market competition
faced by newspapers across districts. Data and regression results show that
endorsements are more frequent in monopolistic than in duopolistic or com-
petitive districts. In monopolistic markets, newspapers might have more space
to make discretionary endorsements. The probit regressions suggest that this
behavior can be explained at least two reasons. Newspapers that self-select
into competitive markets are inherently less likely to make endorsements. Also,
newspapers react strategically to market competition in becoming less likely to
endorse candidates.
The estimates for the structural coefficients show that newspapers are more
likely to be partisan (having a left- or right-wing orientation) than non-partisan.
Partisan papers consider their political alignment when deciding which candi-
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date to endorse. This makes partisan newspapers more likely to make endorse-
ments. Therefore, a larger amount of ”partisan” endorsements might be ob-
served than ”non-partisan” endorsements. The counterfactual exercises show
that under more competition, partisan newspapers’ endorsement practices re-
semble those of non-partisan papers. However, this effect is small.
This chapter advances the understanding of newspaper determinants re-
garding political endorsements. However, further research is needed to un-
derstand newspapers’ motivations in making endorsements (such as a desire to
influence elections) and the mechanisms by which market competition might
affect newspapers.
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CHAPTER 2
THE TUESDAY ADVANTAGE OF CANDIDATES ENDORSED BY
AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS
2.1 Introduction
Newspapers play an important role in society. They serve as a tool for shap-
ing thought, a forum for public discussion and debate, and a way to inform
the public of wrongdoing (Martin and Copeland 2003). The literature presents
evidence that newspapers influence politicians’ behavior and politically inform
readers (Snyder and Stromberg 2008, Barabas and Jerit 2009).
Besides providing news and campaign coverage, many American newspa-
pers make political endorsements during elections. Newspapers publish their
political recommendations one or two months before the election, allocating
part of the editorial page to feature their rationale for a particular endorse-
ment. Closer to the election, they republish a summary list of their endorse-
ment choices. They may provide a more succinct explanation of their decisions
in two or three lines, and in many cases just mention the names of endorsed
candidates.
This chapter examines the electoral performance of candidates endorsed by
American newspapers that have their endorsements republished within one
week of the election. It documents a ”Tuesday Advantage”: candidates who
have a newspaper endorsement republished on Election Day present an elec-
toral advantage in comparison to other candidates who have a newspaper en-
dorsement republished in the week preceding the election.
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I argue that the ”Tuesday Advantage” is explained by readers who vote ac-
cording to newspaper endorsements read on Election Day. Readers might be
more attentive to this information on the day of the election, when they need
to use the endorsement advice, than if they see it prior to that day.1 In this
case, the ”Tuesday Advantage” implies both a causal effect of newspaper po-
litical endorsements on voting outcomes, and that the date of the endorsement
publication determines the effectiveness of this advice.
This interpretation (of a ”Tuesday Effect”) relies on the following evidence.2
First, I investigate whether the ”Tuesday Advantage” is driven by a selection ef-
fect (endorsements of ”stronger” candidates being more likely to be published
on Election Day). I find that endorsed candidates that have their name pub-
lished on Election Day, in fact, are less likely to have favorable electoral charac-
teristics (they are less likely to be incumbents) than other endorsed candidates.
In addition, newspapers do not show signs of strategic behavior in their timing
decisions: most of them do not change their endorsement timing across elec-
tions.
Second, I restrict the sample of endorsed candidates to only those endorsed
by newspapers that switched their endorsement timing across elections. News-
papers do not self-select into endorsing candidates with stronger electoral char-
acteristics. However, the endorsements become more effective when they are
announced on Election Day than otherwise.
1The behavioral literature finds evidence that limited attention affects people’s behavior. For
example, DellaVigna and Pollet (2008) finds that investors are inattentive to news about earn-
ings on Fridays in comparison to other weekdays.
2I refer to endorsements published on Election Day as ”Tuesday Endorsements.” The ”Tues-
day Effect” refers to the causal effect of a ”Tuesday Endorsement” on election outcomes and it
is a suggested interpretation of the ”Tuesday Advantage.” These expressions are used because
American elections take place on Tuesdays.
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This study’s first contribution is to document the ”Tuesday Advantage.”
This advantage is found within a similar group of candidates—the endorsed
ones. In addition, I control for candidate and newspaper characteristics to cir-
cumvent a remaining selection problem. The identification strategy is based on
exploring variation in endorsement publication –on Election Day or just before–
among a homogeneous group of candidates. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first study that shows that the date of an endorsement determines
its effectiveness and that tests whether newspaper endorsements affect election
turnout. The variation in the dataset allows me to quantify relevant hetero-
geneity patterns of the ”Tuesday Advantage” across newspaper and candidate
characteristics. I attempt to identify the determinants of the effectiveness of
newspaper endorsements by examining this heterogeneity. This is the second
contribution of this study. This article reaches conclusions similar to those of
other recent studies about newspaper endorsements’ effects on voting (Ladd
and Lenz 2009, Knight and Chiang 2008): newspapers’ political recommenda-
tions matter and persuade readers to vote for different candidates. In addition,
I find that a ”Tuesday Endorsement” affects candidates’ vote share, but not elec-
tion turnout. Data and regression results suggest that newspapers that repub-
lished their endorsement on Election Day are more partisan (are more likely
to endorse candidates with their political orientation) than other newspapers.
This led them to favor candidates that would get fewer votes in the absence of a
”Tuesday Endorsement.” In light of these results, this chapter also relates to the
literature that seeks to understand how and whether newspapers’ partisan be-
havior affects election outcomes (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007, Kahn and Ken-
ney 2002). It asks: Are newspapers helping to elect ”weaker” candidates that
share their political views with their ”Tuesday endorsements”? The answer is
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no. Although, candidates that share newspapers’political orientation are more
likely to have an endorsement published on Election Day, these candidates do
not seem to derive any benefit from that endorsement. Only candidates whose
politics differ from their endorsing newspapers benefit from this endorsement.
This chapter uses a self-collected dataset containing election results for 817
politicians (158 U.S. House Representatives, 511 state representatives and 148
state senators). They are candidates endorsed by at least one of 103 newspapers
in eight states (California, Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Texas
and Wisconsin), comprised of 696 counties, during the 2002 and 2006 elections.
It proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents a brief overview of the existing
literature. Section 2.3 describes the data. Section 2.4 discusses newspapers’ de-
cisions about endorsement timing and endorsed candidates’ profiles. Section
2.5 presents the regression results. It first documents the ”Tuesday Advantage.”
Then it tests other mechanisms, besides the information provided on Election
Day, that could also explain the effectiveness of the ”Tuesday Endorsement.”
Lastly, it explores the heterogeneity of the ”Tuesday Effect” across candidate
and newspaper characteristics to understand the determinants of this endorse-
ment’s effectiveness. The chapter concludes in Section 2.6.
2.2 Existing Literature
This study relates to the literature evaluating media effects on readers’ political
behavior. The political alignment between media outlets and readers/viewers
(Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010) presents a fundamental complication in quanti-
fying media effects on voting. Viewers choose which media outlets to access
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based on their political standpoint. Thus, it is difficult to identify whether it is
the media outlet that is influencing the viewer, or whether the media outlet is
responding to viewers’ preference in the presentation of political issues.
The literature has found ways to circumvent this complication by explor-
ing how readers/viewers react to media messages exogenous to their political
preferences. Part of the literature has explored natural experiments, comparing
political outcomes pre- and post-entry or -exit of media outlets in the market.
One of these studies show that the entrance of Fox News led to an increase
in turnout and vote share for Republican candidates (DellaVigna and Kaplan
2007). The closure of The Cincinnati Post affected both politicians and citizens’
behavior. Voter turnout decreased, fewer candidates ran for municipal office,
and incumbents became more likely to win re-election (Schulhofer-Wohl and
Garrido 2009).
Snyder and Stromberg (2008) explored variation in the geographical fit of
newspapers and congressional districts to identify an effect of newspapers on
readers’ political behavior. They find that an increase in newspaper coverage
affects readers’ political information. Gerber, Karlan and Bergan (2009) con-
ducted a field experiment, randomly assigning free newspaper subscriptions
to non-newspaper readers. They assigned individuals newspapers with differ-
ent political leanings (The Washington Post and The Washington Times.) They
found that individuals receiving either paper became more likely to support
the Democratic candidate as compared to non-newspaper readers (their control
group).
The identification of newspaper endorsement effects on voting is plagued
by similar problems. Readers’ information about candidates is not observed by
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the researcher. Readers and their respective media outlets might have similar
standards for evaluating candidates. Thus, it is difficult to determine whether a
positive correlation between endorsement and vote is due to readers voting ac-
cording to newspaper recommendation, or whether readers choose candidates
independently from the newspaper recommendation, but using the same crite-
ria.
Previous literature explores the electoral advantage of endorsed candidates
with respect to non-endorsed candidates. In order to circumvent the endogene-
ity of endorsement, these studies control for other candidate characteristics cor-
related with the likelihood of receiving a newspaper endorsement (such as cam-
paign contributions). In this fashion, the regressions are intended to capture the
true effect of newspaper endorsement on votes. These studies include Krebs
(1998), Bullock (1984), Coombs (1981) and Lieske (1989). They find a positive
and statistically significant correlation between endorsements and voting pat-
terns.
This study explores the electoral advantage within endorsed candidates to
lessen the selection problem and determine the effect of newspaper political
recommendations on elections. This effect is identified based on the date a
newspaper last republishes its endorsements: on Election Day, or before. This
study identifies a ”Tuesday Advantage” and proposes an explanation for it: it is
driven by votes that are decided based on endorsements read on the day of the
election. The ”Tuesday Advantage” identifies a lower bound effect of endorse-
ments on vote outcomes.3
3This is because I only identify the difference of vote counts among endorsed candidates.
I do not measure the initial effect of endorsements; that is, the difference endorsed and non-
endorsed candidates.
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Two other recent papers find a newspaper endorsement effect on voting,
using individual-level data. Ladd and Lenz (2009) utilize the British Election
Panel Study and a ”natural experiment approach” to identify the effect of en-
dorsements on voting. They explore the shift in newspaper endorsements in the
1997 British election to favoring the Labour Party. They ask whether readers of
newspapers that switched their endorsements in the 1997 election became more
likely to vote for the Labour Party in comparison to similar individuals who
did not read these endorsement-switching newspapers. Their results show that
newspapers persuaded a large fraction of readers (between 10% and 25%) to
vote differently from the control group.
Knight and Chiang (2008) explore National Annenberg Election Survey data.
They find that readers interviewed after the publication of an endorsement
are more likely to support the endorsed candidate than other readers inter-
viewed before the endorsement announcement. In order to understand how
and whether readers filter political bias from newspaper endorsements, they
structurally estimate the relationship between the candidate and endorsing
newspaper’s political affiliation and the influence of the newspaper endorse-
ment. They find that endorsements for the Democratic candidate from left-wing
newspapers are less influential than those from neutral or right-wing newspa-
pers. This finding is interpreted as evidence that readers take into account news-
paper political orientation when evaluating endorsements.
This study closely relates to Knight and Chiang (2008) in an attempt to un-
derstand the determinants of the effectiveness of newspaper endorsements on
election outcomes. Like that paper, this tests whether candidates with a political
alignment with the endorsing newspaper benefit differently from the (”Tues-
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day”) endorsement than other candidates.
2.3 Data
I collected a new dataset matching county-level data on endorsed candidates’
election results with newspaper and county characteristics. In constructing the
dataset, I first identified the endorsed candidates, looking for information about
newspapers’ political endorsements. The search for endorsements was per-
formed on Lexis and Newsbank databases and newspapers’ websites. It was
focused only on newspapers covered by the Audit Bureau of Circulation.4 The
appendix lists all newspapers in the sample. The search for political endorse-
ments was focused on 103 newspapers in California, Florida, Michigan, Ne-
braska, Ohio, Oregon, Texas and Wisconsin in the 2002 and 2006 general elec-
tions.5 When gathering the data from online resources, I searched for key words
such as ”election,” ”endorsement,” or ”recommendation,” limiting dates to the
range of October 15th until Election Day. I looked for newspaper endorsements
of candidates running in the following races: the U.S. House of Representatives,
the state House, and the state Senate.
After identifying the endorsed candidates, their electoral outcomes—
collected from the Election Division of the Secretary of State—were matched
4The Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC) is a non-profit circulation-auditing organization.
ABC’s conducts independent, third-party audits of newspaper print circulation. Other news-
papers not audited by ABC also made political endorsements. They are not included in this
analysis because information about their circulation is not available.
5These states were selected because the group of newspapers audited by ABC is more rep-
resentative of the total number of newspapers than in other states. They represent around 30%
of total newspapers in these eight states. For the remaining states, ABC’s sample represents
around 20% of total newspapers. Representativeness is crucial to the analysis. Locations where
ABC newspapers are not representative are more prone to have county electoral outcomes erro-
neously matched with a newspaper, and therefore with its last endorsement publication date.
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with the newspapers that made the endorsements.6 Note that candidates are
endorsed at the district level, while their electoral outcome is measured at the
county level. I do this because examining political outcomes at a (sometimes)
finer level (county rather than district level) allows me to explain variation of
electoral outcomes within districts.
Candidates were also matched with characteristics of their endorsing news-
paper. These are political position, total circulation, total number of counties
in which the newspaper circulates and endorsement dates. Newspaper circula-
tion was collected from the 2005 Audit Bureau of Circulation reports. The date
that each newspaper last published its political endorsements was also collected
from Lexis/Newsbank and the newspapers’ websites.
The utilized measure of newspaper political partisanship, referred to as the
GS newspaper political index, was estimated in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010).
In this study, they estimate newspaper political partisanship by examining the
extent to which newspapers used politically charged phrases in their news cov-
erage that resembled phrases used in the speeches of congressional Democrats
or Republicans. They used congresspersons’ ideological positions to identify
newspaper political partisanship. In their study, the congressperson’s ideology
is measured by the share of the 2004 two-party presidential vote total going to
George W. Bush in the congressperson’s constituency. Their political partisan-
ship index varies between zero (in the case that the newspaper’s ideology re-
sembles more closely the ideology of a congressperson with a constituency that
did not vote for Bush at all) and one (if the newspaper resembles more closely
the ideology of a congressperson whose entire constituency voted for Bush).
6If a candidate received an endorsement from multiple newspapers, his/her electoral out-
come was matched to the endorsing newspaper with the highest circulation in the county.
44
In addition to this continuous measure, newspapers were classified as: (i)
left-wing or right-wing; as (ii) moderate or extreme. A newspaper was assumed
to have a right-wing orientation if its GS newspaper political index is greater
than 0.5. A newspaper for which the GS newspaper political index is lower
than 0.5 was assumed to be a left-wing newspaper. Based on the newspaper
relative political position, they were classified as moderate or extreme. I con-
sider the distribution for all newspapers in the Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010)
sample. Newspapers in the sample are classified as extreme if their political in-
dex is greater than that of newspapers in the fourth quartile of the distribution
in the GS sample distribution or if the GS newspaper political index is lower
than that of newspapers in the first quartile of the distribution. The remaining
newspapers were classified as moderate.
Data about politicians’ characteristics, like incumbency and partisanship,
were obtained from the Election Division of the Secretary of State. I identified
the situation in which the candidate had the same political views as the news-
paper endorsing him. This was the case when Democratic candidates received
an endorsement from a left-wing newspaper, or Republican candidates received
an endorsement from a right-wing newspaper. For the endorsed US House can-
didates running in the 2006 election, I collected data about number of previous
winning elections, total money receipts in the race, total opponents’ money re-
ceipts in the race from the Congressional Quarterly Politics. In addition, poll
results from the New York Times were collected.7
Demographic characteristics—education, race, and age—are measured at
the county level. They were collected from the Census Bureau. To identify
county political views, I use the two-party Democratic vote share in the 2004
7http://www.nytimes.com/ref/washington/2006ELECTIONGUIDE.html
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presidential election. This was collected from the Election Division of the Sec-
retary of State. In addition, I constructed an index to identify a measure of
county political homogeneity. This is the absolute distance of the county-level
vote share from the national 2004 presidential vote-share of John Kerry (which
represents a bipartisan county). This index can vary between 0 and 0.5. For ex-
ample, if John Kerry received one hundred percent of the votes (or zero percent
of the votes) in a county, this index would be equal to 0.5. If he received half of
the votes, this index would be equal to zero. According to this variable, hetero-
geneous counties are closer to zero and more homogeneous counties are closer
to 0.5.
All total, the dataset contains electoral results of 817 candidates–158 for the
U.S. House representatives, 511 for the state representatives and 148 for the state
senators. They are candidates endorsed by at least one of 103 newspapers in
eight states (California, Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Texas and
Wisconsin), comprised of 696 counties, during the 2002 and 2006 elections.
2.4 Endorsement Timing and Candidates’ Profile
Table 2.1 shows the average vote share and characteristics of candidates accord-
ing to the last day their endorsing newspaper published its political recommen-
dations.
Candidates that have a newspaper endorsement published on the day of the
election have only a slightly higher (and not statistically different from zero)
vote share than other endorsed candidates. A remaining selection effect masks
the “Tuesday Advantage”: incumbents are less likely to have an endorsement
46
Table 2.1: Vote share and candidate characteristics by last endorsement
Publication
Election Day Before Election Day
Vote Share 59.25 58.84
(13.26) (12.54)
number of counties 1305 1432
Candidates’ characteristics
Incumbent (%) 53.5 60.5
Same political orientation
from the newspaper (%) 54.7 47.7
number of candidates 528 560
Notes: 1) Vote share is measured at the county level. Candidates’
characteristics are measured at the candidate level.
2) Standard deviation are reported in parenthesis.
republished on Election Day. Incumbency status is a strong predictor of candi-
date vote share and of the election winner (Jacobson 2004.) Of candidates en-
dorsed on Election Day, 53.5% were incumbents, as opposed to 60.3% of those
receiving an endorsement before Election Day.8 Table 2.1 also reveals that differ-
ent newspapers weight candidate characteristics differently. Newspapers that
publish their endorsement on Election Day may value political alignment with
candidates more strongly, making them more likely than other newspapers to
endorse challengers.
In order to better understand the nature of selection across candidates, it is
necessary to understand newspaper behavior and why variation in the timing of
endorsements across newspapers is observed. Table 2.2 shows the distribution
of endorsements according to the last day they were published in the 2002 and
8To test this relationship formally, I estimated a probit model explaining the outcome of
candidates having a newspaper endorsement published on Election Day as a function of three
candidate characteristics: incumbency, being a Democrat, and having the same political orienta-
tion from the endorsing newspaper. The incumbency characteristic is found to be a statistically
significant predictor of this outcome. On average, incumbents are 6.1% less likely to have their
endorsement announced on Election Day.
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Table 2.2: Timing: last day of endorsement publication
Election
2002 2006
number of (%) number of (%)
newspapers newspapers
Tuesday (Election) 30 36.1 38 43.2
Monday 14 16.9 14 15.9
Sunday 29 34.9 29 33.0
Before Sunday 10 12.0 7 8.0
Total 83 88
2006 elections.
Most newspapers in the sample last published their list of endorsements on
the day of the election or on the last Sunday before the election. The vast ma-
jority of newspapers in the sample published their list of political endorsements
within two days of the election, both in 2002 (88%) and 2006 (92%).
I conducted interviews with seven newspapers to understand the reasons
behind their timing choices. Most newspapers claim to follow the same prac-
tice over the years. This is consistent with endorsement behavior in the 2002
and 2006 elections (Table 2.3). Most of newspapers in the sample (76%) did not
change their endorsement timing during these elections. This evidence is con-
sistent with the idea that most newspapers do not behave strategically in their
choice of when to republish their endorsements (and that the different profile of
endorsed candidates is explained by newspapers’ intrinsic characteristics, like
their political views.) However, 24% of newspapers switched their endorsement
timing across 2002 and 2006 elections. Those are more likely to act strategically.
This behavior could make difficult to identify the effect of endorsements repub-
lished on Election Day on candidates’ vote share. Newspapers could choose to
republish their list of endorsements on Election Day (when readers might be
more informed) only when they are more confident about their endorsed can-
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Table 2.3: Vote share and candidate characteristics by last publication date
- 2002 and 2006 elections
Same day in both elections
Election Day Before
Election Day
vote share 60.5 58.45
number of counties 745 866
Characteristics
Incumbent (%) 51.9 56.4
Same political orientation 55.3 49.7
from the newspaper (%)
number of candidates 308 330
number of newspapers 21 31
didates’ chance of winning the election. In this case, it would be difficult to
separate this selection effect from a possible ”Tuesday Effect.” However, a brief
scan of endorsed candidates’ profile show that, in fact, the bias occurs in the op-
posite direction. TableS 2.3 and 2.4 shows those newspapers that switched their
endorsement timing across 2002 and 2006 elections, and those newspapers that
did not, have the same pattern of endorsements. Switching newspapers become
less likely to endorse incumbent candidates when they publish the endorsement
on Election Day. Despite that, the average vote share of their endorsed candi-
dates increased (from 58.63% to 58.84%) when the endorsement was published
on the day of the election. This is one piece of evidence for the ”Tuesday Effect.”
Table 2.4 shows that newspapers that publish their endorsement on the day
of the election are more likely to be extreme and have a left-wing orientation,
possibly making them more partisan (demonstrated on Chapter 2.) In addition,
Table 2.5 shows that larger newspapers, like The St Petersburg Times or The De-
troit News are more likely to republish their endorsement lists on Election Day.
Conversely, newspapers that do not follow this practice are more likely to be
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Table 2.4: Vote share and candidate characteristics by last publication date
- 2002 and 2006 elections
Different dates across elections
Election Day Before
Election Day
vote share 58.84 58.63
number of counties 416 291
Characteristics
Incumbent (%) 50.6 62.8
Same political orientation 54.5 50.7
from the newspaper (%)
number of candidates 165 148
number of newspapers 16
Table 2.5: Newspaper characteristics by last endorsement publication -
Mean Values
On Election Day Before Election Day Switched its
in both 2002 and in both 2002 and timing across
2006 elections 2006 elections elections
Newspaper Political Orientation (%)
Extreme 71.4 37.0 25.0
Extreme 71.4 37.0 25.0
Left-wing 95.2 77.4 93.7
Size
Total circulation 311,701 127,312 165,276
(287,229) (129,795) (187,638)
Number of counties 23.9 14.1 14.7
in which it circulates (31.6) (18.7) (17.7)
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis.
small and local. Another explanation for the ”Tuesday Advantage” is a varying
endorsement effect across newspapers. Those that self-select into publishing
their endorsements on Election Day might be more influential than others (this
explanation is further explored in Section 2.5.2).
In this section, I have shown that candidates that have endorsements last
published on different times are not homogeneous. Therefore, a simple com-
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parison of their vote share (as in Table 2.1) does not illustrate the ”Tuesday Ad-
vantage.” In the next section, I present the regression results from an attempt to
make this comparison in a more similar group of candidates.
2.5 Empirical Results
The results are organized in the following way. I document and quantify the
”Tuesday Advantage” within a regression framework. Then, I explore some
possible mechanisms driving the ”Tuesday Effect.” Lastly, interactions of the
”Tuesday Endorsement” with newspaper and candidate characteristics are ex-
plored in order to understand whether and how the ”Tuesday Effect” varies
according to these characteristics.
2.5.1 Tuesday Electoral Advantage
The empirical strategy is to compare the county-level electoral outcomes of en-
dorsed candidates who have a newspaper endorsement republished on Election
Day with those of other endorsed candidates. The variable, yp jct, is the electoral
outcome of candidate p endorsed by newspaper j, in county c, in year t. The
baseline specification is expressed by (1). The parameters are estimated by or-
dinary least squares.
yp jct = α + γT + βcxc + βzz j + βptvp + θt + θr + εp jct (1)
A dummy, denoted by T , indicates whether the candidate had a newspa-
per endorsement republished in a print edition on Election Day. The ”Tuesday
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Table 2.6: Effect of endorsement republished on election day on endorsed
candidate vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Had an endorsement 0.126 -0.317 0.993 1.833
published on Election Day (0.585) (0.578) (0.490)** (0.545)**
Candidate characteristics n n y y
NYC Poll Results n n n n
Newspaper characteristics n n n y
County characteristics n y y y
State, Year and Race-fixed
effects n y y y
R2 0.000 0.089 0.325 0.337
Number of observations 2681 2673 2540 2385
Notes: 1) The dependent variable is candidates’ vote share.
2) Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are
reported in parenthesis. ** 95% significance, * 90% significance.
3) The unit of observation is endorsed candidate-county-election-year.
Advantage” is identified by γ. This reflects the estimated difference in electoral
outcome between candidates that had an endorsement published on Election
Day and other endorsed candidates.
Other characteristics possibly correlated with the vote share of endorsed can-
didates are controlled for. These are xc, representing county demographics and
measures of ideological views, and z j and vpt, representing newspapers’ and
candidates’ characteristics, respectively. Year- and political race-fixed effects are
represented by θt and θr, and εp jct represents a stochastic error term. The stan-
dard errors are clustered at the level of the 696 counties.
I first estimate (1) using candidates’ two-party vote share as the dependent
variable. The results are reported in Table 2.6.
Column 1 gives the results controlling only for a constant that represents the
average vote share of endorsed candidates. Column 1 also shows that the vote
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share of candidates that have an endorsement republished on Election Day is
not different from the vote share of other endorsed candidates. The significance
of this coefficient does not change when county (census and ideological) charac-
teristics are included in the regression (Column 2). As candidate characteristics
are controlled for (Column 3), the coefficient associated with the ”Tuesday Ad-
vantage” becomes statistically different from zero and its size increases. This
reflects the fact that candidates endorsed on Election Day are less likely to be
incumbents (and incumbents have an advantage of 11 percentage point in their
vote share with respect to other endorsed candidates.) Furthermore, the ”Tues-
day Endorsement” occurs in more right-wing counties. In these counties, voters
are less likely to vote for candidates with characteristics that render them more
likely to receive ”Tuesday Endorsements” (e.g., Democratic identification).
Candidates still might be selected based on unobservable characteristics.
For example, challengers that have an endorsement published on Election Day
might be “higher-quality.” In order to circumvent this possible confounding ef-
fect, I control for the political position of the endorsing newspaper.9
In Chapter 1, I present a model of endorsement decisions, where I esti-
mate newspapers’ preferences for candidate characteristics. I find that right-
wing newspapers value political alignment with candidates less highly than
left-wing newspapers do. Roughly speaking, newspapers face a trade-off be-
9Another way to deal with unobservable heterogeneity across candidates should be to com-
pare endorsed candidate vote share, exploring within-candidate variation in endorsements with
the inclusion of candidate fixed-effects in the regressions. The problem with this approach is
that most of the studied races are observed at the local level and in 70% of the cases, candidates
receive only one endorsement. This makes it difficult to perform such a comparison. Another al-
ternative way to establish the causal effect of the ”Tuesday endorsement” on voting is to use an
instrument for the ”Tuesday endorsement.” The difficulty is that the editorial board of a news-
paper decides the timing of endorsements and the choice of candidates. If journalists’ political
ideology drives both decisions, these choices cannot be disentangled. In this case, there is no
variable that conveys variation of the timing of the endorsement uncorrelated with candidates’
characteristics.
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tween candidates’ quality and political alignment when deciding which candi-
date to endorse. The implication of this asymmetry of preferences is that, on av-
erage, right-wing newspapers are more likely to endorse higher-quality candi-
dates than are left-wing newspapers. Candidates endorsed by newspapers with
higher GS newspaper index values—more extremely right-wing newspapers—
present a higher vote share.
Under the assumption that newspapers with the same political position will
face the same trade-off between candidate political alignment and other candi-
date characteristics that accounts for their ”quality,” their endorsed candidates,
on average, should be homogeneous. In this case, the GS newspaper political in-
dex variable controls for a remaining selection on unobservable characteristics
across candidates endorsed by different newspapers. Interestingly, when this
variable is included in the regression, the size of the coefficient associated with
having an endorsement published on Election Day becomes larger. This sug-
gests that candidates endorsed on Election Day are also selected in ”weaker” un-
observable characteristics (they are both less likely to be incumbents and more
likely to have other characteristics that garner them fewer votes.)10
As a robustness check, I restrict the sample only to US House of Repre-
sentative candidates running during the 2006 election (since more information
about their political career and poll results are available.) Table 2.7 bring the
results. Column 1 shows the regression results with the previous controls. The
coefficient associated with having an endorsement published on Election Day is
positive and statistically significant at 7% level. Column 2 contains the results
including additional variables to control for candidates’ characteristics that pos-
sibly make them more likely to receive more votes (regardless of receiving an
10The regression results describing all the covariates are in Leon (2009).
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Table 2.7: Effect of endorsement republished on election day on endorsed
candidate vote share
(1) (2)
Had an endorsement published on Election Day 1.647 1.802
(0.963)* (0.982)*
Candidate characteristics y y
NYC Poll Results n y
Newspaper characteristics y y
County characteristics y y
State, Year and Race-fixed
effects y y
R2 0.408 0.573
Number of observations 538 478
Notes: 1) The dependent variable is candidates’ vote share.
2) Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are
reported in parenthesis. ** 95% significance, * 90% significance.
3) The sample is restricted to US House candidates in the 2006 election.
4) The unit of observation is endorsed candidate-county-election-year.
endorsement.) These are: number of previous winning elections, total money
receipts in the race, total opponents’ money receipts in the race, and New York
Times Poll results. The size and significance of the coefficient related to the
“Tuesday Advantage” is not affected by the inclusion of these extra variables.
This is additional evidence that the reported advantage is explained by a “Tues-
day Effect.”11
Table 2.8 presents the regressions explaining turnout in a political race. The
dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio between the total turnout in the
county for the studied race and county population.
Column 1 shows that races in which the endorsement is republished on the
day of the election have lower turnout than other races. This effect disappears
when controls are added to the regression (Column 2.) Controlling for state- and
year-fixed effects, none of the newspaper or county ideological characteristics
11See Leon (2009) for more details about these regressions.
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Table 2.8: Effect of endorsement republished on election day on turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Had an endorsement -0.149 -0.045 -0.050 -0.296
published on Election Day (0.097) (0.061) (0.150) (0.313)
Candidate characteristics n y y y
Newspaper characteristics n y y y
County characteristics n y y y
State, Year and Race-fixed
effects n y y y
R2 0.000 0.381 0.515 0.385
Number of observations 2681 2385 469 221
Notes: 1) The dependent variable is log(turnout/population).
2) Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are
reported in parenthesis. ** 95% significance, * 90% significance.
3) The unit of observation is county-election-year.
seem to be correlated with the turnout in political races.
This null result holds in aggregate (Column 1 and 2.) However, newspa-
per endorsements might have ambiguous effects on turnout. The vote decision
might depend on voters evaluation of candidates and voters might decide to
vote only if they think highly of the preferred candidate.12 If newspaper en-
dorsements affect candidate evaluation, they might, thereby mobilize support-
ers to vote for the endorsed candidates and inhibit voting among other candi-
dates’ supporters. Voters’ predisposition toward voting for a specific candidate
is not observable. To proxy for that, I identified a group of counties that are
likely to support the endorsed candidate, and a group of counties that support
the endorsed candidate’s opponent (regardless of the newspaper endorsement.)
This county classification is based on election results. I consider endorsed can-
didates’ ”county supporters”, the counties in which the endorsed candidate re-
ceived more than 70% of two-party election votes. Counties in which the en-
dorsed candidate received less than 40% of votes were assumed to support the
12This assumption was used by Degan and Merlo (2009), for example.
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opponent.
The problem with this proxy is that vote share is an endogenous variable.
Clearly (as defended in this chapter) the endorsement published on Election
Day most likely affect candidates’ vote share. Nevertheless, the magnitude of
this effect is modest (between 1 and 2 percentage points). For these considered
counties, it is reasonable to assume that they were supporting the endorsed can-
didate or his/her opponent, regardless of any endorsement made. Column 3 (4)
shows the results restricting the sample only to counties assumed to be support-
ing the endorsed candidate (endorsed candidate’s opponent.) Again, the coef-
ficient associated with Election Day endorsement publication is not statistically
significant.
In summary, Tables 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 results show that the ”Tuesday Endorse-
ment” might play a role in readers’ decisions of whom to vote for. However, I
did not find evidence that it affects readers’ decision of whether to vote or not.
A possible explanation is that readers who seek newspaper advice have already
made up their minds to vote, and so this decision is not affected by newspaper
endorsements. The results presented in this section show that, for candidates
running for election in these relatively low visibility races—the US House of
Representatives, state house and state senate—having a newspaper endorse-
ment republished on Election Day increases their vote share by 1.9 points. In
non-presidential general election years, most information in the media, and in
the voter’s general interest, is in high-visibility races such as gubernatorial races
and U.S. Senate races. One explanation for a possible ”Tuesday Effect” is that
readers’ attention is focused on these large-scale elections. On Election Day,
if readers are uninformed about candidates running in local races, they might
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follow last minute political recommendations, such as those made by newspa-
pers.13
2.5.2 ”Tuesday Effect” Mechanisms
In this section, I address some possible mechanisms driving the ”Tuesday Ef-
fect.” It might be explained by a same-day effect (for example, if readers pay
more attention when they read a newspaper recommendation on Election Day
than before). Or it could be due to other factors correlated with this endorse-
ment.
For one, ”Tuesday Endorsements” are republished more often than other
endorsements. Table 2.9 presents the distribution of number of times that news-
papers republish their endorsements in the three days preceding the election.14
Most of the newspapers that publish their endorsements on Election Day do it
more often (once or twice) than newspapers that do not publish their endorse-
ments on the day of the election (zero or one time). If readers retain endorse-
ment information read before Election Day, but randomly choose when to read
the newspaper editorial section, candidates that have their endorsement repub-
lished more often are more likely to gain votes due to the endorsement. This
could be an explanation for the ”Tuesday Advantage.”
To account for this mechanism, I conducted the regressions including dum-
mies indicating the number of days the endorsed candidate had the endorse-
ment republished. The results are reported on Table 2.10.
13Consistent with this interpretation, I performed the estimations for the gubernatorial race
and I did not find a ”Tuesday Advantage” result.
14Most newspapers in the sample (75%) start reprinting their endorsement list on the last
Sunday before the election.
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Table 2.9: Percentage of newspapers by last endorsement publication
2002 election 2006 election
Total number of Before Before
publication days Election Day Election Day Election Day Election Day
0 18.9 0.0 18.0 0.0
1 75.5 23.3 82.0 23.3
2 5.7 60.0 0.0 60.0
3 0.0 16.7 0.0 16.7
Number of
newspapers 53 30 50 38
Note: Total number of publication days refers to the times that newspapers
republish their endorsements in the three days preceding the election.
Table 2.10: Effect of endorsement republished on election day on endorsed
candidate vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Had an endorsement 0.767 0.823 1.856 1.720
published on Election Day (0.774) (0.681) (0.601)** (0.643)**
Number of publication days
Three 0.195 -0.820 0.256 0.902
(1.594) (1.897) (1.786) (2.148)
Two -2.850 -2.950 -1.248 -1.184
(1.493)** (1.672)* (1.593) (1.872)
One -1.429 -1.159 0.049 -0.846
(1.312) (1.561) (1.516) (1.792)
Candidate characteristics n y y y
Newspaper characteristics n n n y
County characteristics n n y y
State, Year and Race-fixed
effects n y y y
R2 0.006 0.099 0.324 0.339
Number of observations 2615 2607 2474 2372
Notes: 1) The dependent variable is candidates’ vote share.
2) Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are
reported in parenthesis. ** 95% significance, * 90% significance.
3) The unit of observation is endorsed candidate-county-election-year.
The coefficient associated with having an endorsement published on Elec-
tion Day is robust to this specification and the days-dummies are not statisti-
cally significant. This shows that the frequency with which the endorsement
is published is not correlated with candidates’ vote share, while having an en-
dorsement published on Election Day is correlated with vote share.
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Table 2.11: Effect of endorsement republished on election day on endorsed
candidate vote share
(1) (2)
Had an endorsement published on Election Day 1.823 1.379
(0.848)** (0.894)
Candidate characteristics y y
Newspaper characteristics y y
County characteristics y y
State and Race-fixed effects y n
Newspaper and Race-fixed effects n y
R2 0.408 0.438
Number of observations 682 682
Notes: 1) The dependent variable is candidates’ vote share.
2) Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are
reported in parenthesis. ** 95% significance, * 90% significance.
3) The sample is restricted to candidates endorsed by newspapers
that switched endorsement timing across elections.
4) The unit of observation is endorsed candidate-county-election-year.
Another explanation for a ”Tuesday Effect” is that endorsements from na-
tional and larger newspapers are the ones influencing voters. These newspa-
pers are also more likely to publish their recommendations on Election Day, as
illustrated in Table 2.4.
I conduct regressions restricting the sample only to candidates endorsed by
newspapers that switched their endorsement timing across the 2002 and 2006
elections. These are newspapers that last republished their list of political en-
dorsements on Election Day in the 2002 election, and last republished their list
of political endorsements before Election Day in the 2006 election, or vice-versa.
I test whether, on average, endorsed candidates have a higher vote share when
the newspaper publishes its endorsement on Election Day than otherwise. The
purpose of this is to test whether the ”Tuesday Advantage” result is robust to
the characteristics of newspapers that self-select into republishing their endorse-
ments on Election Day.
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Table 2.11 illustrates the results. The coefficient associated with the ”Tuesday
Endorsement” is positive (1.82) and it is statistically significant, different from
zero at the 7% level of confidence (Column 1). In Column 2, I present the re-
sults obtained by controlling for newspaper-fixed effects. The coefficient is still
positive (1.38), but in this case the ”Tuesday Advantage” is only statistically sig-
nificant at the 12.5% level of confidence. These results are not as strong as the
ones shown in Table 2.6. However, the point estimate for the coefficient associ-
ated with having an endorsement published on Election Day is very similar. An
explanation for this ”weaker” result is the smaller sample size (it is 3.45 times
smaller than the one for which the regressions in Table 2.6 were conducted),
combined with a larger number of covariates being controlled for. Under this
specification, the test might not have enough power to detect an effect.
2.5.3 Heterogeneity of the ”Tuesday Effect”
If the ”Tuesday Advantage” is explained by readers basing their votes on en-
dorsements, it should be larger in cases of more influential endorsements. In an
attempt to identify what determines the effectiveness of the ”Tuesday Endorse-
ment,” I perform an analysis of interactions of a dummy indicating whether the
candidate had an endorsement republished on Election Day with candidate and
newspaper characteristics. The purpose is to quantify whether the ”Tuesday Ef-
fect” varies according to these characteristics.
Column 2 in Table 2.12 presents the results of the interaction of the coefficient
associated with the ”Tuesday Advantage” with two newspaper characteristics.
The first is whether the endorsing newspaper is among the top 100 largest pa-
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pers in the US: larger newspapers might be perceived as more reliable and be
more influential. I also test whether the ”Tuesday Effect” differs if the endorse-
ment is made by moderate or by extreme newspapers. Extreme newspapers
could be more politically biased, and their endorsements might be perceived
differently.15
The regression results does not detect heterogeneity across these newspaper
characteristics. It does not reject the hypothesis that top 100 largest newspapers
are more influential than other papers. It also suggests that endorsements made
by extreme newspapers are not perceived differently than endorsements made
by moderate newspapers.
Column 3 in Table 2.12 describes the results of interactions with two candi-
date characteristics –sharing the political orientation of the endorsing newspa-
per, and incumbency. Newspapers endorse both Republicans and Democrats,
but the effect of the endorsement might vary, according to the match of a can-
didate’s political point of view with that of the newspaper endorsing them. To
test this, I interact the Tuesday endorsement with a dummy indicating whether
the candidate shares the political orientation of their endorsing newspaper.
Some studies claim that one of the reasons for the incumbency advantage in the
United States is the name recognition of these candidates (Gerber 2004; Jacob-
son 1978, 1985). Incumbents might benefit more from ”Tuesday Endorsements”
15Dellavigna and Kaplan (2006) develop a model to understand the consequences of media
bias on readers/viewers evaluation of media announcements. Readers are assumed to be uncer-
tain about candidates’ quality and media political position. Readers update their beliefs based
on media announcements (like their endorsements, for example.) The model makes predictions
about readers’ evaluation of candidates as a function of how extreme (and therefore politically
biased) the endorsing newspaper is. They assumed two different cases: (i) readers process
media information filtering out newspapers’ political preferences; (ii) readers process media in-
formation without filtering out these preferences. Their result is that in case (ii), readers are
affected by media bias and the size of this effect is increasing in the level of newspaper extrem-
ism. In case (i), readers are not affect by media bias and the level of newspaper extremism does
not affect evaluation of candidates.
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Table 2.12: Effect of endorsement republished on election day on endorsed
candidate vote share
(1) (2) (2)
Had an endorsement published on Election Day 1.833 2.776 3.424
(0.545)** (1.052)** (1.313)**
Had an endorsement published on -1.050
Election Day*Extreme Newspaper (0.795)
Had an endorsement published on -0.533
Election Day*Top 100 newspaper (1.151)
Had an endorsement published on 0.432
Election Day*Incumbent (1.076)
Had an endorsement published on -3.577
Election Day*Same political orientation (1.313)**
from the newspaper
Candidate characteristics y y y
Newspaper characteristics y y y
County characteristics y y y
State, year and race-fixed effects y y y
R2 0.337 0.336 0.340
Number of observations 2371 2371 2371
Notes: 1) The dependent variable is candidates’ vote share.
2) Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in
parenthesis. ** 95% significance, * 90% significance.
4) The unit of observation is endorsed candidate-county-election-year.
since readers/voters are more familiar with these candidates and political rec-
ommendations could reinforce readers’ propensity to vote for these candidates.
The results show that candidates with a political orientation different from
that of the newspaper endorsing them, who also have a newspaper endorse-
ment published on Election Day, have an advantage of 3.42 points with respect
to other endorsed candidates (Column 3). The regression results show that in-
cumbents do not benefit differently from endorsements than other candidates.
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter documents the electoral advantage of candidates who have a news-
paper endorsement republished on Election Day in comparison with other can-
didates who have a newspaper endorsement republished on days prior to the
election. This finding holds for low-visibility races, such as the state Senate, the
state House and the U.S. House of Representatives.
Assuming that candidates endorsed at different times are otherwise compa-
rable, the documented ”Tuesday Advantage” amounts to a ”Tuesday Effect” on
votes. This is a sufficient condition to prove the existence of a newspaper en-
dorsement effect on votes, and that the date of an endorsement’s publication
shapes its effectiveness. The estimated effect is a lower bound number to the
total effect of newspaper endorsements on vote outcomes. This is because I do
not measure the initial effect of endorsements on electoral outcomes for papers
that last republish their endorsements on a date prior to the election.
I argue that newspaper endorsements affect candidates’ vote share because
readers make voting choices based on endorsements they read on the day of the
election. Citizens might follow last-minute reliable recommendations, such as
those made by their local newspaper on Election Day, in races in which they are
still undecided by the time they have to vote. These recommendations might
be taken more seriously than others because readers pay more attention on en-
dorsements on the day they need to use this information.
The regressions performed in this study suggest that ”Tuesday Endorse-
ments” affect candidates’ vote-share, but not voter turnout. A possible ex-
planation is that readers who seek newspaper advice have already made up
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their minds to vote, and so this decision is not affected by newspaper endorse-
ments. The results show that a ”Tuesday Endorsement” can affect candidates’
vote share, on average, between 1.3 and 1.9 points.
The results also reveal that ”cross-partisan” endorsements—Democrats
endorsed by right-wing newspapers or Republicans endorsed by left-wing
newspapers— are more influential than ”same-partisan” endorsements. Knight
and Chiang (2008) find results consistent with this chapter. Their explanation is
based on readers’ rationality. Readers understand that newspapers have lower
standards in endorsing candidates with their political views. This leads readers
to think more highly of the other endorsed candidates (who do not share the
endorsing newspapers’ political point of view.)
This study does not interpret the current results as conclusive evidence that
readers filter out media bias when evaluating endorsements. This is because
I did not find an effect on turnout. The results reveal that the way that the
”Tuesday Endorsement” affect voters is only by helping readers to decide who
to vote for. If readers not exposed to newspaper recommendations vote based
on candidate’s party identification16, only the effect of ”cross endorsements” are
identified.17 Therefore, the results found in this chapter are not conclusive about
readers’ behavior.
16See Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder (2008) and Jesse (2009.)
17To illustrate this point, consider the hypothetical case of a reader politically aligned with his
newspaper, for example, a Democrat voter that reads a left-wing newspaper. In addition, as-
sume this reader blindly follows his newspapers’ recommendations if he sees them on Election
Day or otherwise votes according to candidates’ political orientation. In this case, if this Demo-
cratic reader see an endorsement of the Democratic candidate, he would vote just the same as
he would vote in the absence of an endorsement. The endorsed Democratic candidate would
not get an extra vote due to this endorsement. Nonetheless, if his newspaper had endorsed a
Republican candidate, this candidate would get an extra vote due to the endorsement.
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Despite that, this study’s result addresses another important public policy
concern. Are newspapers helping to elect ”weaker” candidates that share their
political views with their ”Tuesday endorsements”? Does media bias affect elec-
tion outcomes? In Section 2.4, I show that candidates that have a newspaper
endorsement published on Election Day have characteristics, other than receiv-
ing this endorsement, that makes them get less votes. This can be explained by
newspapers’ incentives to advertise candidates that share their political views.
Nonetheless, at least for the ”Tuesday Endorsement” case, media bias does not
affect election outcomes. Only candidates with different political views from
the endorsing newspaper benefit from the ”Tuesday Endorsement.”
The chapter’s results shed some light on both reader and newspaper behav-
ior. The literature that theoretically models newspaper behavior is silent on
how newspaper and reader interaction might affect each one’s candidate eval-
uation. Dellavigna and Kaplan (2006) and Knight and Chiang (2008) model the
effects of media announcements on readers’ voting behavior. They assume that
newspapers confront rational readers who evaluate newspaper recommenda-
tions. Readers have some prior knowledge about newspapers’ political prefer-
ences, and use a Bayes’ rule to recover the unknown parameter of interest that
will affect their votes (in their case, the candidates’ quality) from newspaper
recommendations. However, newspapers’ endorsement decisions are assumed
exogenous to readers’ preferences. A reasonable assumption is that, in their
choices of who to endorse and when to publish the endorsement, newspapers
internalize how readers react to their endorsements and their ability to affect
elections. Further theoretical and empirical development is needed to under-
stand newspapers’ electoral motives and how citizens evaluate and respond to
the advice of opinion makers, such as newspapers, interest groups, electoral
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polls and student organizations, taking into account that those opinion makers’
decisions respond to citizens as well.
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